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Abstract
The literature on the relationship between foreign aid and institutions has found that the effects of aid vary
across different donor characteristics and delivery mechanisms. This article focuses on China’s resourcerelated development projects, which have been considered controversial due to the relative lack of conditionality. By distinguishing between vertical and horizontal dimensions of political accountability, the
study finds that China’s resource-related projects are particularly detrimental to the accountability of
recipient countries’ horizontal (legislative and judicial) institutions. These projects are often delivered
to resource-rich countries, in the form of packaging access to resources and infrastructure construction,
to improve China’s own energy access. Local officials may be tempted to weaken horizontal institutions
so that the projects can be implemented quickly. Nevertheless, these projects have little effect on vertical
accountability, as China has less intention and capacity to fundamentally restrain electoral competition in
recipient countries.
Keywords: China’s development projects; political accountability; natural resources; state-owned enterprises

Many recent studies have examined the impact of foreign development assistance on institutions
in recipient countries. As Dietrich and Wright (2013) summarize, some studies group development flows with other types of ‘unearned income’ and find that foreign aid may undermine
democratic governance by encouraging rent seeking and corruption, allowing leaders to buy support and decreasing citizens’ demands (for example, Ahmed 2012; Bräutigam and Knack 2004;
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008; Knack
2004; Moss, Pettersson and Van de Walle 2006).
However, other studies emphasize the variations in donors’ preferences and delivery mechanisms, arguing that under certain conditions – such as when funding conditionality is credibly
imposed, when donors have a preference for democracy or when aid programs are adequately
tailored – foreign aid is effective at helping democratic institutions develop and survive
(Bermeo 2011; Dietrich and Wright 2014; Dunning 2004; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson
2007; Scott and Steele 2011).
With its rapid economic growth, China has become a crucial donor of development flows in
recent decades. However, as a non-traditional donor that has abstained from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC),
its economic assistance is considered controversial. Both Western donors and recipient countries
have concerns about China’s motivation and potentially disruptive effects on recipients. For
example, in 2018, then-US National Security Advisor John Bolton criticized China’s predatory
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction
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foreign aid, especially the related programs in Africa (Holland and Wroughton 2018). In the same
year, Malaysia officially declined infrastructure-related projects funded by China, which could
potentially lead to the country’s bankruptcy (Erickson 2018). Nevertheless, many developing
countries prefer Chinese financing because it is associated with few political conditions due to
China’s non-interference principle, and tends to emphasize infrastructure projects and productive
activities (Alves 2013; Furukawa 2018).
China’s economic assistance is substantially different from conventional aid. Based on the
literature, the features of non-conditionality and no preferences for democracy are expected to
prevent its assistance from improving democratic institutions. Despite criticism that they have
potentially adverse effects, limited cross-sectional quantitative research has explored how and
why China’s development projects affect the political institutions of recipient countries. In this
article, we focus on Chinese development programs related to natural resources, such as energy
generation and mining. We examine how the features of these programs influence the political
accountability of recipient countries. In contrast to previous studies that mainly rely on a binary
or one-dimensional definition of democracy, we distinguish between horizontal and vertical
aspects of political accountability. Horizontal accountability refers to the capacity of horizontal
institutions – including legislatures, judicial branches and ombudsmen – to impose constraints
on executive power. Vertical accountability concerns electoral restraints on the executive. Both
aspects are key mechanisms of political control and are at the core of good governance: vertical
accountability is the defining element of democratic governance, on which many good consequences of democracy depend, while weakened horizontal institutions may lead to executive
abuse of power and autocratization processes. Separating these two aspects allows us to more
rigorously examine how these unique financial flows have differential impacts on institutions.
Utilizing time-series cross-sectional data that cover the period from 2000 to 2014 and about
130 developing countries, we find that China’s resource-related programs erode political institutions in recipient countries. However, the negative effect is only found for horizontal accountability. We argue that this is mainly due to the strategic goal and delivery mechanism of these
programs. China provides development assistance largely in the form of official investment in
energy production and infrastructure building through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to fulfill
its energy demands. Political systems with weak checks and balances are convenient for
China’s resource-driven aid strategy as well as officials in recipient countries. Such unconditional
financial flows benefit incumbents more directly and can be used to compromise horizontal institutions. This funding from China is also attractive to officials aiming for economic growth.
Incumbents may be tempted to circumvent horizontal institutions so that construction can be
implemented quickly. We also use an instrumental variable setup and the generalized synthetic
control (GSC) approach to verify the causal relationship.
In addition to contributing to the literature on the external factors of regime changes, our results
offer insights into the conditions under which foreign economic assistance can lead to adverse consequences. Improving governance is at the core of development efforts, and a more systematic
understanding of how Chinese aid strategy influences political accountability is required.

Foreign Aid and Political Institutions
Studies investigating the relationship between aid and political institutions have provided a mixed
picture. Many scholars argue that aid is likely to undermine institutions and democratic governance. These studies highlight the similarity between aid and other types of non-tax revenue, such
as natural resources. They argue that governments that are less dependent on internal sources of
revenue tend to be less accountable to their citizens and have fewer incentives to establish effective
institutions (Ahmed 2012; Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010;
Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2008; Moss, Pettersson and Van de Walle 2006). Aid
inflows also release political leaders’ revenue constraints, freeing up more resources to patronize
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or repress potential oppositions without incurring political costs, which may result in the stabilization of dictatorships (Morrison 2007; Remmer 2004). Additionally, aid tends to encourage rent
seeking and corruption, particularly when donors impose few conditionalities on recipients
(Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016; Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2008; Hodler and
Raschky 2014; Knack 2004).
In contrast to this pessimistic view, some recent studies criticize comparisons between aid and
natural resources as inaccurate. Given aid’s relative infungibility and conditionality, it can
improve the prospects of democratic change (Altincekic and Bearce 2014; Bermeo 2016b).
Other studies focus on the heterogeneity of donors and their delivery mechanisms, and suggest
that foreign assistance can strengthen democratic institutions under certain circumstances. For
example, if conditionalities are credibly imposed, recipient governments have more incentives
to comply with aid goals and implement institutional reforms (Dunning 2004; Knack 2001).
When aid allocation is conditional on recipients’ democratic performance, democratic change
is more likely to occur (Kersting and Kilby 2014). Furthermore, democracy assistance is particularly helpful in strengthening institutions when it is carefully targeted at specific sectors (Dietrich
and Wright 2014; Jones and Tarp 2016; Scott and Steele 2011). Bermeo (2011) shows that aid
from democratic donors tends to be associated with democratic transitions because they are
more likely to have a preference for democracy and intend to reward recipient countries that
are moving toward democracy.
Following research that disaggregates aid based on donor preferences and delivery mechanisms,
we focus on Chinese assistance, particularly resource-related programs, and investigate its effects
on political institutions. With its well-known non-interference policy, there seems to be no indication that China intentionally supports authoritarianism abroad. However, it does not co-operate
with traditional donors or adhere to the principles established by them (Mawdsley, Savage and
Kim 2014; Strange et al. 2013). The most notorious feature is the lack of conditionality to promote
political reform and good governance. Based on previous studies, the lack of both conditionality
and preferences for democracy promotion lead to the expectation that Chinese economic engagement has negative, or at least non-positive, effects on institutions.
Nevertheless, the claims find mixed support, and little cross-sectional quantitative evidence
has been provided (Dreher et al. 2018). Some studies express concerns that Chinese aid is
more likely to be subject to capture and undermine governance (Tull 2006; Wako 2018), while
some find no evidence supporting this negative association (Bader and Daxecker 2015;
Bräutigam 2009). Focusing on one and several African countries, Brazys, Elkink and Kelly
(2017) and Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018), respectively, find that Chinese projects are associated
with increased perceptions of local-level corruption. Although corruption can be considered a
symptom of weakening institutions, it is not clear whether the findings can be extrapolated to
the macro level or to other recipient countries. With regard to overall regime type, scholars
have not reached a consensus on whether China’s economic assistance undermines democracy
and stabilizes authoritarianism (Bader 2015a; Bader 2015b; Jenkins 2010).

China’s Resource-Related Projects and Political Accountability
Chinese development flows take many different forms, including humanitarian aid, medical aid,
debt relief and volunteer programs (Alves 2013). Among the different types, we focus on projects
related to natural resource development (China’s resource-related projects, hereafter CRPs).1
These projects are provided by China largely with the expectation of meeting its energy demands.
China is not the only country using aid to increase its economic benefits. As a rapidly growing
economy requiring a massive amount of energy (State Council (PRC) 2012), however, China
1
As an anonymous reviewer reminded us, only a small subset of Chinese development financing meets the DAC definition
of ‘aid’. Therefore, we refrain from referring to these official financial flows as aid.
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Figure 1. Financial flows provided by China, 2000–2014

differs from other donors in the resource-driven nature of its assistance programs (Alves 2013).
China has been become a net importer of oil products since 1993 (Leung, Li and Low 2011). It
provides economic assistance to resource-abundant countries for a return in natural resources
(Buckley et al. 2007; Dreher et al. 2018). For instance, China sometimes receives a contractual
portion of oil production (called ‘share oil’) as part of its aid package.
Another feature of CRPs is the packaging of access to resources and infrastructure projects,
which has become a common practice of China in many resource-rich countries (Bader and
Daxecker 2015; Brazys, Elkink and Kelly 2017). The funding for roads, railways, ports and
power generation facilities improves local resource production and transportation, and allows
China to secure the supply of resources (Alden and Alves 2009). Although not all Chinese assistance projects are related to resources, according to AidData’s Global Chinese Official Finance
Dataset (Dreher et al. 2017), projects classified in the categories of energy generation, mining
and transportation accounted for 72 per cent of the total amount provided by China from
2000 to 2014. As shown in Figure 1, this percentage has significantly increased since the 2010s.
These projects are largely delivered through Chinese SOEs, which in 2005 controlled 83 per
cent of the country’s outbound investment flows. Despite a recent gradual decrease, SOEs still
monopolize several sectors, including oil and gas, telecommunications and construction
(Kolstad and Wiig 2012; Wang and Zhao 2017). As a national policy instrument, SOEs implement China’s foreign assistance as well as seek profits. This is not a typical delivery mechanism
of OECD development assistance, which does not classify investment as a form of foreign aid.
Previous studies on the relationship between foreign aid and institutions mostly utilize conventional measures that combine different features of a regime into one-dimensional indices.
However, as recent research has suggested (see Coppedge et al. 2011), democratic/non-democratic
governance involves multiple features, and aid may have a differential impact on different institutions (Doucouliagos 2019). We focus on political accountability institutions as our dependent
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variable, and distinguish between vertical and horizontal accountability. The power to hold politicians accountable is fundamental to representative democracy. Both aspects of accountability are
key mechanisms of political control. They have distinct roles in subjecting the executive to electoral competition and constraining the executive, and may be influenced differently by foreign
projects, as Dietrich and Wright (2014) suggest.
Vertical accountability concerns electoral restraints on the executive branch of the government
(O’Donnell 1998; Mechkova, Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). Incumbents have to respond to
voters’ preferences in order to be re-elected. Citizens are better able to exert electoral control
over politicians when certain conditions are met: suffrage is extensive, main office holders are
selected through regular competitive elections without fraud, and opposition parties can freely
organize and compete for power (Dahl 1973). Horizontal accountability refers to the capacity
of horizontal institutions – such as legislatures, judicial branches and ombudsmen – to impose
constraints on executive power (O’Donnell 1998, 119). When these institutions have instruments
with which to question, investigate and exercise oversight of the executive, abuse of power by the
government is more likely to be prevented (Fish 2006; Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1997).
Additionally, if horizontal institutions are strengthened, the wrongdoings of government officials,
such as corruption, are more likely to be exposed and punished, significantly increasing the costs
of such behavior (Kolstad and Wiig 2016; McMann et al. 2019). Overall, vertical accountability is
the key element of electoral democracy, while horizontal accountability is related to, but more
fundamental than, the concept of institutional quality.

Horizontal Accountability
We propose that CRPs have different effects on horizontal and vertical accountability. Due to the
unique features of these programs as described above, they are expected to be particularly harmful
to horizontal institutions in recipient countries for several reasons.
First, prior studies have demonstrated that conditionality and carefully targeted projects are
crucial mechanisms through which the detrimental effects of aid can be deterred and institutional
reforms can be encouraged. However, as a highly corrupt autocracy itself, China is indifferent to
using aid to improve democratic governance in recipient countries. Without conditions imposed
on aid disbursement, leaders are better able to exploit aid for patronage (Hout 2007; Molenaers,
Dellepiane and Faust 2015). Additionally, CRPs are provided largely due to China’s high energy
demand. To continuously satisfy such a demand, economic support has to be consistently provided, and the threat of stopping aid if recipients do not meet governance conditions would
not be credible. Dietrich and Wright (2013, 61) posit that foreign funding may ‘damage the development of effective checks and balances in recipient countries by reinforcing the power of the
executive at the expense of legislative constraints’ when the assistance is mainly directed to the
executive. According to Bader (2015b), Chinese aid benefits incumbent governments more directly than Western aid. In some cases, it is even based on requests from recipient governments
(Dreher et al. 2016; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018),2 which further intensifies the tendency to
use unconditional flows to buy off potential legislative opposition and reinforce executive power.
Secondly, CRPs are likely to amplify the potential adverse effects of natural resources on the
quality of institutions in recipient countries. General regulations and constraints are unfavorable
to Chinese SOEs seeking privileges in host countries. Resource-driven investments require host
countries that can award contracts for oil drilling or allow preferential access for the procurement
of certain goods. During negotiations for resource access, political systems with fewer veto players
are expected to grant agreements more expeditiously and with more flexibility. Horizontal institutions that can exert considerable constraints are able to restrict leaders’ abilities to make
2
Request-based aid is proposed by the recipients; donors decide whether to approve it after reviewing the proposal.
Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka is a typical example.
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arbitrary policies (Bodea, Garriga and Higashijima 2019) and favor particular investors. An opaque institutional environment in which policies can be passed without detailed scrutiny is therefore preferred by the Chinese government. As the aid provider has an interest in weakened
horizontal institutions, politicians in recipient countries may be induced to dismantle institutions
that regulate the use of natural resources (Ross 2001) in order to attract assistance and obtain
rents. Politicians who seek more exclusive and discretionary rights to allocate state assets are likely
to weaken institutions that constrain them (Ross 2001).
One reason for the attractiveness of CRPs is the packaging of access to resources and infrastructure buildings. The funding of development projects creates a ‘get-rich-quick’ mentality
that is similar to commodity booms (Ross 2001, 30). Under such conditions, as Mazzuca’s
(2013) analysis of resource windfalls suggests, incumbents are tempted to remove checks and balances to allow excessive short-term consumption. Although aid inflows are not identical to commodity booms, CRPs may lead to a similar tendency. The massive provision of infrastructure
mirrors China’s own successful development experience (Alves 2013; Démurger 2001;
Ravallion 2009), and receiving these projects seems to signify the country is on the right growth
trajectory. Because loans typically do not need to be repaid for several years, mega infrastructure
projects are tempting to politicians faced with electoral competition. To quickly facilitate such
construction initiatives, incumbents may strive to dominate the decision-making process at the
expense of legislatures. In the name of national development, even actors capable of imposing
scrutiny are reluctant to raise objections.
Overall, political systems with weak checks and balances are convenient for China’s resourcedriven aid strategy. To attract funds and fulfill the expectation of national development more
quickly, politicians may be tempted to circumvent horizontal accountability institutions. In addition, due to the non-conditionality feature, the executive has ample resources it can use to compromise the oversight capacity of horizontal institutions.
China’s projects in Ecuador have demonstrated this tendency. China has provided Ecuador
with billions of dollars in loans, most of which has been used for infrastructure and energy projects. In return, China has received oil as loan collateral. In the construction of the Coca-Codo
Sinclair hydroelectric dam, top Ecuadorean officials pressed ahead with the project despite warnings and overlooked environmental and engineering problems; the officials responsible for monitoring the project appear to have been bought off so the project could proceed (Casey and Krauss
2018). Chinese projects in several other places, including Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway and
Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, were also rushed to approval despite contracts that were opaque,
feasibility reports that raised concerns and officials’ circumvention of regulations (Abi-Habib
2018; Marsh 2019). To systematically verify this tendency, we formulate the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1: China’s resource-related development projects have a negative impact on horizontal accountability in recipient countries.
One may be concerned that the proposed negative relationship is due to China selectively providing assistance to countries already with weak institutions. However, Dreher and Fuchs (2015)
and Wako (2018) find that China’s aid allocation is independent of recipients’ institutional quality. In the analyses, we also utilize instrumental strategies to determine the causal direction.
One may also wonder whether China would have an interest in preventing the weakening of
checks and balances in order to provide its SOEs with more predictable and transparent investment environments. In CRPs, Chinese SOEs have the dual responsibilities of aid delivery and foreign direct investment that seeks profits. Indeed, investments may be adversely affected by
executive expropriation in systems where horizontal institutions are incapable of checking unilateral executive decision making (Jensen 2008; Jensen, Malesky and Weymouth 2014). However,
unlike other foreign private investors, Chinese SOEs are funded by the state (Nordensvard,
Urban and Mang 2015; Ru 2018) and are thus more accepting of risks (Buckley et al. 2007;
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Kolstad and Wiig 2012). State endorsement helps protect SOEs from deprivation by the host government and makes them more resilient to weak institutions. State-backed SOEs can bribe local
officials to weaken regulations and win contracts. For example, a former Hong Kong government
official, Chi Ping Patrick Ho, attempted to bribe politicians in Chad to waive fines for environmental violations and maintain an unfair competitive advantage for CEFC China Energy, a
Shanghai-based conglomerate (Marsh 2018). Since a majority of CRPs are implemented by
Chinese SOEs (as shown in the next section), which have no interest in improving the governance
of recipient countries, the negative impacts of CRPs on horizontal institutions are expected to be
further reinforced.

Vertical Accountability
Concerning vertical accountability, we hypothesize that the adverse effects of CRPs tend to be
insubstantial for several reasons. First, in the post-Cold War era, once elections with some competition have been established, it is difficult for them to be entirely abolished. Mechkova,
Lührmann and Lindberg (2017) note that elections are high-profile events and can be more easily
observed by the international community and media. Violating such highly visible institutions
incurs higher legitimacy costs (Schedler 2013). The blatant manipulation of electoral results or
the widespread or harsh intimidation of the opposition are likely to trigger protests (Bunce
and Wolchik 2010). Furthermore, because democratic promoters emphasize elections, holding
multiparty elections helps rulers attract more resources from Western donors (Kim and
Kroeger 2017; Levitsky and Way 2010; Reinsberg 2015). The literature on the recent pattern of
‘autocratization’ (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019) shows that in the last decade, improvements
in democratic governance have mostly been in the area related to elections (Lührmann et al.
2018; Mechkova, Lührmann and Lindberg 2017). Bermeo (2016a) and Coppedge (2017) find
that dramatic democratic breakdowns have become rarer; autocratization through the gradual
concentration of power in the executive and the weakening of checks and balances has become
more common.
Secondly, and more importantly, the packaging of access to resources and infrastructure
projects has mixed effects on vertical accountability. On the one hand, improving a country’s
infrastructure can lead to economic growth and better living conditions (Bougheas,
Demetriades and Mamuneas 2000; Esfahani and Ramírez 2003), which are important preconditions for popular demands for more political participation. Habiyaremye (2013) finds that
China’s infrastructure-for-resource strategy in Africa has led to higher growth rates than other
forms of assistance. When aid promotes economic development, it helps improve electoral competition in the long term (Kersting and Kilby 2014).
On the other hand, rulers may also use infrastructure projects to appease and repress citizens
(Altincekic and Bearce 2014). With regard to appeasement, the provision of public goods
improves the welfare of a large population of citizens and thereby diminishes their desire for
regime change (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). China’s direct financing of energy and
transportation construction, which constitute public goods without taxation, is expected to pacify
disaffected citizens. Regarding repression, although transportation facilities help citizens organize
demonstrations, they also allow leaders to send troops and suppress revolts more easily.
Development projects may also replace money that governments would have spent on infrastructure, thus freeing funds for other uses, including repression. Overall, we argue that it is more difficult for incumbents to terminate electoral institutions, and China’s infrastructure-for-resource
strategy has mixed effects on popular political mobilization. Therefore, CRPs are expected to
have only a minimal influence on vertical accountability. We propose the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 2: China’s resource-related development projects do not have a significant impact on
vertical accountability in recipient countries.
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Data and Measures
Dependent Variable

To explore the effects of China’s resource-related assistance on different aspects of political
accountability, we mainly rely on the data provided by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (dataset version 8). The project distinguishes among various aspects of institutions and governance, each measured using several detailed and concrete indicators.3 We utilize the V-Dem
horizontal accountability index as an indication of legislative and judicial control over the executive. The index is formed by point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model, which
includes the extent to which the national legislature/parliament is capable of questioning, investigating and exercising oversight of the executive, particularly when the executive is involved in
potentially illegal or unethical activities. The index also combines whether the executive complies
with judicial decisions and whether the judiciary can act independently to prevent the executive
abuse of power. Instead of formal rules, the index focuses on actual practices of these horizontal
institutions, which are more likely to be affected by inflows of development projects.
We also use the checks and balances variable provided by the Database of Political Institutions
(DPI) (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini 2016) as an alternative dependent variable. It captures the
number of partisan and institutional veto players. However, because it includes a component
of vertical accountability (whether members of the legislature are appointed by the executive),
it is less suitable for analysis in this article.
To verify whether CRPs have less significant effects on the electoral aspect of accountability,
we use the V-Dem vertical accountability index. The index is also formed by point estimates
from a Bayesian factor analysis model. It combines whether: elections are free and fair, the
chief executive is directly or indirectly selected through elections, suffrage is extensive, and political parties can form and operate freely. The Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2017) political competition index, which measures the competitiveness and inclusiveness of political
participation, is also used as an alternative variable.
Independent Variable

The key explanatory variable is based on data collected by AidData’s Global Chinese Official
Finance Dataset (Dreher et al. 2017). The dataset documents officially financed Chinese projects
to other countries during 2000–2014.4 Because our theoretical arguments are based on the features of CRPs, we distinguished between projects related to energy generation, mineral mining,
and transportation and other projects. For the former, resource-related flows, we aggregate all projects in the categories of ‘Energy Generation and Supply’ (3-digit CRS sector code: 230), ‘Industry,
Mining, Construction’ (320) and ‘Transport and Storage’ (210) to create country-year level
variables.5 For the latter, we aggregate projects in all other categories to verify that the expected
relationships between China’s assistance and accountability can be mainly attributed to the
features of its resource-driven strategy. Following the literature (for example, Bermeo 2016b;
Dietrich and Wright 2014), the logged value of (one plus) funds per capita and funds as a
share of gross national income (GNI) are calculated to reduce right skew. In addition, as
Dietrich and Wright (2014) suggest, to ensure that the measures capture the current level of

3

Appendix A contains more detailed information on the V-Dem project and a discussion of its methodological limitations.
It includes both projects that meet the OECD criteria of official development assistance (ODA) and those without development intent. Because the Chinese government does not release project-level data, the data are estimated by triangulating
publicly available information from various sources.
5
Information on more detailed classifications of subsectors is not available. Among all 4,312 projects documented in the
dataset, 874 are classified in these three categories; the funding for these projects accounts for 72 per cent of the total funds
provided by China.
4
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inflows rather than large fluctuations in a given year, the measures are averaged over 3 years
(t, t − 1, and t − 2).
To verify whether the involvement of SOEs further reinforces the negative association between
CRPs and horizontal accountability, we distinguish between projects implemented by Chinese
SOEs and those executed by other agencies. Of all 4,312 projects in the dataset, AidData has
information on the implementing agencies for 1,242 of them (494 resource related, 748 other categories). We check the features of these agencies to classify projects as either involving Chinese
SOEs or not.6 Consistent with previous descriptions, CRPs are largely delivered through their
SOEs. Of the 1,242 projects for which we have information on the implementing agencies, 83
per cent of resource-related projects involve Chinese SOEs, while SOEs implement only 43 per
cent of projects in other categories. For a recipient in a given year, inflows from these two
types are aggregated separately. Similarly, 3-year averages of funds per capita and funds as a
share of GNI are log-transformed.
To determine the causal direction, we employ an instrumental variable suggested by Dreher
et al. (2017): the interaction of Chinese steel production in a given year with the recipient country’s probability of receiving CRPs. As Dreher et al. (2017) point out, China’s annual production
of steel is closely related to its capacity to supply development projects, because the Chinese government considers steel a strategic commodity, and some of its steel surplus is used as inputs for
aid. The data on China’s annual steel production during 2000–2014 are taken from the National
Material Capabilities dataset (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972). We lag the data for an additional
year to allow for a delay between domestic overproduction and international projects. Each recipient country’s probability of receiving CRPs is calculated as the fraction of years from 2000 to 2014
in which the country received positive amounts of Chinese financing in the three relevant categories. Chinese steel production only varies over time and is exogenous to the institutional
accountability of recipient countries. One might be concerned that the probability of receiving
CRPs may directly affect accountability. As Dreher et al. (2016, 2017) explain, since the probability of receiving funds varies only across countries, and country fixed effects are also included in
the regressions, the interaction between the probability and an exogenous variable results in an
exogenous instrument (see Bun and Harrison 2019).

Controls
We include several potential confounders as control variables. To estimate the effects of China’s
financing and conventional aid separately, we control for countries’ inflows of official development assistance (ODA). Because the Chinese financial amounts documented by AidData
most closely represent commitment amounts rather than net disbursements, to facilitate comparison, we use OECD data on ODA commitments.7 Consistent with the measures of China’s
financing, 3-year averages of ODA per capita and ODA as a share of GNI are calculated and
log-transformed.
Since political accountability is a key feature of representative democracy, we follow previous
studies on regime transition and survival to select the remaining controls. The literature has suggested economic development as an important factor of democratic transitions and consolidation
(for example, Boix and Stokes 2003; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). To account for a country’s
general level of development, we include logged GDP per capita in purchasing power parity
6
Our classification differs slightly from that of AidData. We code an agency as a Chinese SOE if it is a subsidiary of a giant
SOE, or if there is a specific section on its website promoting the manifesto of the Chinese Communist Party. Among agencies originally classified as non-SOEs by AidData, we identify eighteen of them as SOEs. Analyses based on both classifications generate consistent results.
7
In Tables B.1 and B.2, we include analyses with ODA net disbursements, and the results are consistent. The ODA measure does not include Chinese aid flows. As the AidData codebook indicates, the Chinese government has opted out of international reporting systems.
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terms. An indicator of GDP growth rate is also included, as economic performance has been
shown to be strongly associated with the likelihood of regime breakdown (Gasiorowski 1995;
Treisman 2015). Data on both variables are taken from the World Development Indicators
(WDI). Rulers can use natural resource rents to consolidate their control; such rents thus have
negative effects on the openness and competitiveness of political participation (Ross 2015). We
use Ross and Mahdavi’s (2015) measures of per capita net oil and gas export value to calculate
natural resource rents.
Studies on regime diffusion find that countries tend to adopt and sustain democracy/autocracy
if more countries in the same region are democratic/authoritarian (Gleditsch and Ward 2006;
Miller 2015). Therefore, we include a measure of annual average Polity scores in a given politicogeographic region. To account for a country’s previous experience with democracy, we follow
Gerring et al. (2005) and construct a measure of democracy stock based on Polity scores.
Appendix Table A.1 reports the descriptive statistics of these variables. Excluding countryyears classified as ‘high income’ in the WDI dataset, the analysis covers the period from 2000
to 2014 for approximately 130 countries in the regions of Africa, the Middle East, Asia and
the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Central and Eastern Europe. To address omitted variable bias concerns, we include country and year fixed effects in the time-series crosssectional models. In all models, independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Each model is run
with robust standard errors to account for the issues of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
In addition to ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regressions
with two-way fixed effects, we also use the GSC approach proposed by Xu (2017) to examine
the robustness of the results. Fixed effects models rest on the ‘parallel-trend’ assumption,
which holds that without CRPs (treatment), institutional accountability would have been the
same on average between countries receiving and not receiving assistance. The GSC method is
designed to address the possibility that the outcomes may be driven by some unobserved timevarying confounders between treated and non-treated cases. Based on information of non-treated
cases, this method imputes ‘counterfactuals’ that incorporate the unobserved confounders for
treated countries, from which we can better estimate the causal effects of Chinese financing on
accountability. In this approach, the independent variable is modeled as a binary treatment.
We classify a country as ‘treated’ if it received positive amounts of Chinese financing in the
three relevant categories. Because resource-related projects tend to involve fixed assets, a country
is considered treated from the first year in which it received funding.

Analysis
Tables 1 and 2 show the estimated effects of CRPs on horizontal accountability. The measures of
Chinese and conventional aid as a share of GNI are employed in Table 1, and models with measures of aid per capita are presented in Table 2. In both tables, the dependent variable of Models
1–6 is the V-Dem horizontal accountability index. Model 1 only includes the measure of CRPs,
while Chinese projects of other categories and conventional ODA are controlled in Model 2.
The results show that Chinese projects in the categories of energy, mining and transportation
have consistent negative effects on horizontal accountability, either measured as a percentage
of GNI or per capita, while Chinese funding of other categories does not have significant effects.
Model 3 replicates Model 2 with 2SLS regressions, where the first-stage instrument is the interaction of Chinese steel production and the probability of receiving CRPs. The weak identification
tests show that the instrument explains a sufficient amount of variance in Chinese
resource-related flows, particularly the per capita measure. Model 4 includes additional controls.
The results of Models 3 and 4 are generally consistent with those of Model 2.8 Based on Model 2
8
In Tables 1 and 2, the coefficients for CRPs in Model 3 (2SLS) are greater than the corresponding coefficients in Model 2
(OLS). This may be because the financial values of CRPs, particularly as shares of GNI, are more subject to short-term

Table 1. Regression estimates of the effect of CRPs (% GNI) on horizontal accountability

DV

Horizontal
accountability
1
OLS

ln China’s flows % GNI −0.0899**
(resource-related)
(0.0417)
ln China’s flows % GNI
(other categories)
Polity
Polity × ln China’s
flows
% GNI
(resource-related)
ln ODA % GNI

Horizontal
accountability
2
OLS
−0.0779**
(0.0392)
0.0120
(0.0345)

Horizontal
accountability
3
2SLS
−0.248**
(0.106)
−0.000171
(0.0178)

Horizontal
accountability
4
OLS
−0.0782**
(0.0385)
−0.00904
(0.0332)

Horizontal
accountability
5
OLS
−0.0680**
(0.0312)
0.00643
(0.0295)
0.0388***
(0.00840)
0.00484

0.0691***
(0.0263)
0.0979***
(0.0264)

0.0656***
(0.0223)
0.0875***
(0.0131)

ln GDP per capita
GDP growth
Oil export per capita

−0.0314**
(0.0157)
−0.0168
(0.0157)

−0.238**
(0.0949)
−0.185
(0.191)

Democracy stock

0.0891***
(0.0331)
0.0705***
(0.0234)
0.178
(0.126)
−0.00532**
(0.00224)
−0.000037*
(0.00002)
−0.000022
(0.000039)
−0.000722
(0.000744)

0.0777***
(0.0293)
0.0278*
(0.0142)
0.241**
(0.113)
−0.00638***
(0.00192)
−0.000043**
(0.000019)
−0.000019
(0.000038)
−0.00129*
(0.000686)

0.0252**
(0.0120)
−0.00645
(0.00660)
0.00573
(0.0570)
−0.00520**
(0.00206)
−0.000018*
(0.0000096)
−0.00003
(0.000021)
−0.00103***
(0.000345)
−0.214***
(0.0357)
−0.0463
(0.481)
v
v
1,388
126
787.2
0.111

0.523***
(0.183)
−0.0119
(0.161)
−0.344
(0.356)
0.0117*
(0.00603)
0.000043
(0.000051)
−0.00022
(0.00015)
−0.000188
(0.00236)

−1.565
(1.065)
v
v
1,496
127
324.3
0.091

−2.096**
(0.947)
v
v
1,496
127
412.5
0.191

LDV
0.166***
(0.0282)
v
v
1,709
141
114.9
0.034

−0.125
(0.0815)
v
v
1,658
139
266.2
0.110

v
v
1,378
137
123.9
−0.137
27.7
17.99

4.645
(3.042)
v
v
1,349
125
− 1,797.0
0.033
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Gas export per capita

Country FE
Year FE
N
Countries
Log likelihood
adj. R-sq (within)
Cragg-Donald Wald F
Kleibergen-Paap F

Checks
7
OLS

(0.00551)

Regional avg. polity

Constant

ΔHorizontal
accountability
6
OLS

Note: all independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in brackets. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table 2. Regression estimates of the effect of CRPs (per capita) on horizontal accountability

ln China’s flows per
capita
(resource-related)
ln China’s flows per
capita
(other categories)
Polity

Horizontal
accountability
2
OLS

Horizontal
accountability
3
2SLS

Horizontal
accountability
4
OLS

Horizontal
accountability
5
OLS

−0.0469***

−0.0948***

−0.0452***

−0.0460***

−0.0146**

−0.107**

(0.0182)

(0.0159)
0.00627

(0.0264)
0.000291

(0.0160)
−0.0156

(0.0142)
−0.00824

(0.00679)
−0.00860

(0.0449)
−0.120*

(0.0199)

(0.00771)

(0.0164)

(0.0133)
0.0380***
(0.00804)
0.00245
(0.00215)

(0.00627)

(0.0675)

0.125***
(0.0361)
0.0913***
(0.0245)

0.0954***
(0.0174)
0.0810***
(0.0123)

0.124***
(0.0349)
0.0643***
(0.0216)
0.118
(0.120)
−0.00476**
(0.00215)
−0.000029
(0.00002)
−0.000026
(0.00004)
−0.000833
(0.000691)

0.0954***
(0.0295)
0.0226*
(0.0131)
0.196*
(0.110)
−0.00588***
(0.00188)
−0.000039**
(0.000017)
−0.000018
(0.00004)
−0.00150**
(0.000686)

0.506***
(0.159)
−0.0369
(0.160)
−0.669*
(0.357)
0.0137**
(0.00600)
0.000051
(0.000055)
−0.00024
(0.00015)
−0.000174
(0.00234)

−1.322
(1.026)
v
v
1,505
127
341.8
0.124

−1.902**
(0.929)
v
v
1,505
127
430.4
0.221

0.0296**
(0.0126)
−0.00715
(0.00670)
−0.00332
(0.0557)
−0.00492**
(0.00209)
−0.000016*
(0.0000093)
−0.000031
(0.000022)
−0.00104***
(0.000339)
−0.224***
(0.0349)
−0.0202
(0.464)
v
v
1,396
126
776.1
0.112

Regional avg. polity
ln GDP per capita
GDP growth
Oil export per capita
Gas export per capita
Democracy stock
LDV

Country FE
Year FE
N
Countries
Log likelihood
adj. R 2 (within)
Cragg-Donald Wald F
Kleibergen-Paap F

Checks
7
OLS

−0.0522***

Polity × ln China’s flows
per capita
(resource-related)
ln ODA per capita

Constant

ΔHorizontal
accountability
6
OLS

0.167***
(0.0280)
v
v
1,709
141
123.9
0.044

−0.443***
(0.136)
v
v
1,705
141
232.4
0.159

v
v
1,419
139
129.3
−0.031
71.44
60.29

Note: all independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in brackets. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

6.625**
(2.913)
v
v
1,357
125
−1,802.2
0.042
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in Table 1, the effect of a 50 per cent increase in the financial values of CRPs is roughly equivalent
to the effect of the same amount of decrease in conventional ODA (or a 0.3-point decrease in
regional average Polity scores), and is associated with a reduction of 0.03 on the horizontal
accountability scale, which roughly has a mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1.
To verify whether the effects of China’s funding vary across regime types, in Model 5 we
include the Polity score and its interaction term with CRPs. The coefficients for CRPs retain significant negative estimates, while the interaction shows no significant influence. That is, CRPs are
detrimental to horizontal institutions in both democratic and non-democratic regimes. Model 6
uses the annual change in country i’s horizontal accountability index score from year t – 1 to t as
the dependent variable. In Model 6, the lagged dependent variable (LDV) is included as a proxy
for omitted variables and controls for the possibility of temporal correlation.9 The dependent
variable of Model 7 is the DPI checks and balances index. The results of both Tables 1 and 2
show that CRPs are also negatively associated with the alternative measure of horizontal
accountability.
Table 3 shows the same analyses with different measures of vertical accountability as the
dependent variable. The measures include the V-Dem vertical accountability (Models 1–4 and
6–9) and Polity IV political competition indices (Models 5 and 10). Models 1–5 use the share
of GNI as the measure of foreign financial flows, while Models 6–10 employ the per capita measures. Models 1 and 6 are OLS regressions with CRPs, Chinese assistance of other categories and
ODA as independent variables. Models 2 and 7 replicate Models 1 and 6 with 2SLS regressions.
Models 3–5 and 8–10 incorporate additional controls. In Models 4 and 9, the dependent variable
is the annual change in vertical accountability, and the LDV is also taken into account. Across
these models with different specifications, the coefficients for indicators of CRPs are negative
but not significant, and are generally less than half of the corresponding coefficients reported
in Tables 1 and 2, which use horizontal accountability as the dependent variable. The results
are consistent with our theoretical expectation: CRPs tend to be harmful to horizontal accountability institutions, but their effects on electoral competition and participation are less clear.
Appendix Tables B.1–B.8 present additional robustness checks. Tables B.1 and B.2 include
analyses with ODA net disbursements as the measure of conventional aid. To verify whether
the results depend on particular data transformation, Table B.3 includes models using nonlogged measures, logged financial values without divided by population and the number of
Chinese development projects in relevant categories as the key independent variables.
Table B.4 includes models with different time-series specifications. The models in Table B.5
are based on imputed data. Across these robustness checks, the results are generally consistent
with those in Tables 1–3. The dependent variables in Tables B.6 and B.7 are composing indicators of the horizontal and vertical accountability indices, respectively. The results show that
the associations reported in Tables 1–3 are not driven by only a few components. In Models 1
and 2 in Table B.8, we aggregate all Chinese projects, and in Models 3 and 4 we only account
for projects of other categories. The negative effects of these other-category projects on horizontal accountability are less significant. The results are consistent with our theoretical expectation that the negative association between China’s development projects and accountability is
mainly based on features of its resource-driven strategy.

fluctuations than the instrument. The variance in the raw measures of CRPs is roughly four times that of the predicted values
used in the second-stage regressions of 2SLS.
9
Model 6 in Tables 1 and 2 and Models 4 and 9 in Table 3 include the LDV. These models are in the form of ΔYt = α0 +
α1Yt−1 + β1Xt−1 + εt, and are equivalent to Yt = a∗0 +a∗1 Yt−1 + b1 Xt−1 + 1t (index score in time t as the dependent variable,
and LDV included in the right-hand side) (De Boef and Keele 2008). The DVs of horizontal and vertical accountability are
moderately trended, and thus the analysis should account for LDV. However, for a limited sample covering only 15 years,
models with country fixed effects along with LDV can lead to bias (Nickell 1981). Therefore, we do not include the LDV
in all models.
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Table 3. Regression estimates of the effect of CRPs on vertical accountability

ln China’s flows % GNI
(resource-related)
ln China’s flows % GNI
(other categories)
ln ODA % GNI

Vertical
2
2SLS

−0.0364
(0.0403)
−0.0240
(0.0503)
0.0719*
(0.0415)

−0.117
(0.101)
−0.0317*
(0.0187)
0.0396*
(0.0226)

Vertical
3
OLS
−0.0388
(0.0404)
−0.0238
(0.0598)
0.0702
(0.0475)

ΔVertical
4
OLS
−0.0160
(0.0146)
0.0139
(0.0295)
0.0361*
(0.0195)

Competition
5
OLS
−0.0193
(0.100)
−0.0787
(0.120)
−0.121
(0.146)

ln China’s flows per capita
(resource-related)
ln China’s flows per capita
(other categories)
ln ODA per capita
Regional avg. polity

0.120***
(0.0398)

0.111***
(0.0167)

ln GDP per capita
GDP growth
Oil export per capita
Gas export per capita
Democracy stock

0.124**
(0.0497)
0.0550
(0.149)
−0.000678
(0.00423)
−0.0000085
(0.000025)
−0.000021
(0.000025)
−0.000639
(0.000804)

LDV
Constant
Country FE
Year FE
N
Countries
Log likelihood
adj. R2 (within)
Cragg-Donald Wald F
Kleibergen-Paap F

0.107
(0.110)
v
v
1,658
139
77.67
0.133

v
v
1,378
137
159.3
0.066
27.703
17.99

−0.383
(1.296)
v
v
1,496
127
60.80
0.124

0.0232*
(0.0130)
0.00384
(0.0852)
0.0000317
(0.00366)
−0.000011
(0.000013)
−0.00001
(0.000022)
−0.000810**
(0.000351)
−0.255***
(0.0344)
0.00929
(0.709)
v
v
1,388
126
357.9
0.110

0.220**
(0.110)
−0.197
(0.377)
0.00578
(0.00551)
0.0000061
(0.000076)
−0.00003
(0.000065)
−0.000170
(0.00225)

7.967**
(3.177)
v
v
1,456
127
−1,481.3
0.049

Note: all independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in brackets. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Vertical
6
OLS

Vertical
7
2SLS

Vertical
8
OLS

ΔVertical
9
OLS

Competition
10
OLS

−0.0261
(0.0173)
−0.000370
(0.0196)
0.100**
(0.0435)
0.114***
(0.0393)

−0.0443
(0.0276)
−0.00836
(0.00711)
0.0672***
(0.0207)
0.109***
(0.0163)

−0.0272
(0.0175)
−0.00670
(0.0243)
0.102**
(0.0416)
0.119**
(0.0492)
0.0108
(0.145)
−0.000438
(0.00408)
−0.0000031
(0.000026)
−0.000024
(0.000024)
−0.000728
(0.000757)

−0.00962
(0.00599)
0.00665
(0.0106)
0.0364*
(0.0199)
0.0220*
(0.0128)
−0.0209
(0.0838)
0.000147
(0.00359)
−0.00001
(0.000011)
−0.000012
(0.000021)
−0.000831**
(0.000352)
−0.259***
(0.0343)
0.156
(0.665)
v
v
1,396
126
363.2
0.110

0.0145
(0.0579)
−0.0473
(0.0474)
0.0841
(0.123)
0.220*
(0.112)
−0.181
(0.359)
0.00643
(0.00541)
0.000031
(0.000076)
−0.000041
(0.000062)
−0.0000837
(0.00226)

−0.115
(0.155)
v
v
1,705
141
75.44
0.154

v
v
1,419
139
140.0
0.094
71.443
60.29

−0.231
(1.227)
v
v
1,505
127
69.70
0.142

7.341**
(2.971)
v
v
1,464
127
−1,502.5
0.053
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Figure 2. Average treatment effects of CRPs on accountability. (a) Horizontal accountability, (b) Vertical accountability. The
shaded area depicts a 95% confidence interval of the average treatment effects (ATEs)

To complement the fixed-effects analyses and examine whether the results are robust to unobserved confounders, Figure 2a shows the average treatment effects (ATEs) of CRPs on horizontal
accountability over time using the GSC method.10 The gray area depicts the 95 per cent
10
The analyses are conducted using R gsynth package (Xu 2017). Other covariates are China’s flows of other categories
per capita, ODA per capita, GDP per capita, GDP growth and regional average Polity scores.
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Table 4. Regression estimates of the effect of China’s SOE development flows on institutional accountability

ln China’s SOE flows %
GNI
(resource-related)
ln China’s SOE flows %
GNI
(other categories)
ln China’s SOE flows per
capita
(resource-related)
ln China’s SOE flows per
capita
(other categories)
ln China’s non-SOE flows
% GNI
(resource-related)
ln China’s non-SOE flows
% GNI
(other categories)
ln China’s non-SOE flows
per capita
(resource-related)
ln China’s non-SOE flows
per capita
(other categories)
ln ODA % GNI

Vertical
accountability
2

−0.0498**

−0.0177

(0.0222)
−0.0199

(0.0371)
−0.0248

(0.0492)

(0.0434)

0.0728***
(0.0266)

Constant
Country FE
Year FE
N
Countries
Log likelihood
adj. R 2 (within)

0.0930***
(0.0267)
−0.119
(0.0878)
v
v
1,491
137
378.9
0.111

Vertical
accountability
4

−0.0299***

−0.0184

(0.0113)
0.00525

(0.0155)
−0.00496

(0.0229)

(0.0142)

0.0590
(0.0396)

ln ODA per capita
Regional avg. polity

Horizontal
accountability
3

0.115***
(0.0414)
0.148
(0.121)
v
v
1,491
137
173.4
0.133

Horizontal
accountability
5

0.0310

0.00948

(0.162)
−0.0210

(0.0819)
0.0907

(0.0564)

(0.0591)

0.0745***
(0.0254)
0.119***
(0.0371)
0.0855***
(0.0249)
−0.405***
(0.142)
v
v
1,534
139
335.3
0.152

0.0887**
(0.0440)
0.108***
(0.0412)
−0.0468
(0.166)
v
v
1,534
139
172.5
0.147

Vertical
accountability
6

0.0931***
(0.0271)
−0.126
(0.0886)
v
v
1,491
137
373.9
0.105

Note: all independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in brackets. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Horizontal
accountability
7

Vertical
accountability
8

−0.01000

−0.0138

(0.0550)
−0.0231

(0.0324)
0.0202

(0.0200)

(0.0234)

0.119***
(0.0380)
0.0867***
(0.0260)
−0.412***
(0.145)
v
v
1,534
139
326.2
0.142

0.0873**
(0.0440)
0.109***
(0.0414)
−0.0470
(0.167)
v
v
1,534
139
170.0
0.145

0.0568
(0.0395)
0.116***
(0.0415)
0.147
(0.119)
v
v
1,491
137
173.8
0.133
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confidence interval generated by bootstraps. The plot shows how horizontal accountability
changes in recipient countries once they receive CRPs, compared with the control units. The
ATE averaged over all periods is -0.2, with a standard error of 0.052. That is, averaged over all
post-treatment periods, receiving CRPs results in a 0.2 decrease on the horizontal accountability
scale in recipient countries. Figure 2(b) displays the same analyses on vertical accountability,
where the estimated ATE of CRPs is not significantly different from zero. The estimates are consistent with the regression results and suggest that CRPs are associated with a statistically significant decrease in horizontal accountability, while the effects on vertical accountability are
insignificant.
Finally, to further verify whether the involvement of SOEs reinforces the negative association
between CRPs and horizontal accountability, in Models 1 to 4 in Table 4, both measures of CRPs
and other-category assistance only take into account projects in which at least one of the implementing agencies is a Chinese SOE. The results of Models 1 to 4 are generally consistent with
those shown in Tables 1–3: CRPs are negatively associated with horizontal accountability and
do not have a significant influence on electoral indices, while the effects of Chinese projects in
other categories, despite being implemented by SOEs, are minimal on both aspects. In Models
5–8 in Table 4, the measures of China’s financial flows only incorporate projects that do not
involve Chinese SOEs, and we find no significant relationships between CRPs and horizontal
accountability in any of the models. Due to the high percentage of missing data on the implementing agencies for Chinese development projects, the results may not be conclusive.
However, the comparison between Models 1 to 4 and Models 5 to 8 still lends some support
to our theoretical argument: Chinese resource-driven assistance, particularly when delivered
through SOEs, is associated with weakened horizontal institutions in recipient countries.

Conclusions
In this article, we investigate the influence of financial flows from a prominent new donor, China,
on the political institutions of recipient countries. We find that China’s resource-related development projects have detrimental effects on the horizontal aspect of political accountability of
recipient governments, but only minimal impacts on vertical accountability. Due to data limitations, more thorough analyses on the implementing agencies or for a longer time period have not
been conducted. However, the proposed relationships are robust to different model specifications
and causal identification methods.
Our findings are important for at least three reasons. First, by focusing on unique Chinese
strategies, the findings contribute to the literature arguing that foreign assistance has heterogeneous effects on political institutions, depending on donors’ preferences, delivery mechanisms
and targeted sectors. Our findings further highlight the differential effects on different institutions: some foreign flows do not substantially erode electoral regimes, but they may have negative
impacts on other institutions and thus warrant more consideration from the international
development community. Secondly, our findings speak to recent studies on the possibilities of
autocratization, which point out the gradual concentration of power in executive branches as a
common process. We argue that external factors can be conducive to such a process. Finally,
some authoritarian countries have been labeled ‘black knights’, which are claimed to promote
autocracy in other countries, but the mechanisms remain unclear. Our findings propose a possibility: China does not deliberately export autocracy to recipient countries, but the features of
its resource-driven assistance lead to some negative impacts.
Our results also suggest two promising areas for future research. First, the China case illustrates that development projects in some categories are more harmful than in others. Whether
assistance from other unconventional donors, particularly projects emphasizing productive
activities, shows a similar pattern merits further investigation. Secondly, can traditional donors
adjust their aid packages to better meet the needs of developing countries, replacing the favored
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non-interference principle? Since Chinese assistance may be helpful in economic growth, examining how to alleviate its negative impacts is an important question for future studies.
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